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Abstract
Firewalls are network devices dedicated to analyzing and filtering the traffic in order to separate network segments
with different levels of trust. Generally, they are placed on the network perimeter and are used to separate the intranet
from the Internet. Firewalls are used to forbid some protocols, to shape the bandwidth resources, and to perform
deep packet inspection in order to spot malicious or unauthorized contents passing through the network. In a
wireless multihop network, the concept of perimeter is hard to identify and the firewall function must be
implemented on every node together with routing. But when the network size grows, the rule-set used to configure
the firewall may grow accordingly and introduce latencies and instabilities for the low-power mesh nodes. We
propose a novel concept of firewall in which every node filters the traffic only with a portion of the whole rule-set in
order to reduce its computational burden. Even if at each hop we commit some errors, we show that the filtering
efficiency measured for the whole network can achieve the desired precision, with a positive effect on the available
network resources. This approach is different from the protection of a space behind a wall: we use the term waterwall
to indicate a distributed and homogeneous filtering function spread among all the nodes in the network.
1 Introduction
Protecting a network from unsolicited, often malicious
traffic is one of the constant concerns of any network
administrator. Apart from standard networking devices
as switches and routers, middleboxes as NATs and fire-
walls are normally installed on the network boundary to
separate trusted portions of the network from the global
Internet and in general from less trusted ones.
In some cases, however, even the separation between
the internal and the external network is not straightfor-
ward, and identifying boundaries and points of intercon-
nection is even more difficult. A typical example is a
wireless mesh network, in which a collection of subnets
are interconnected through a backbone of mesh nodes,
but each subnet is only loosely coupled with the others.
Moreover, many points of access to the global Internet
may exist (see Figure 1 for a pictorial representation).
Mesh networks are often used with this configuration in
order to bring connectivity in a cost-effective way to areas
where other technologies would be too expensive [1]. As
a concrete example, community networks [2,3] use this
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approach to share network resources between hundreds
or even thousands of users and represent one of the most
successful application of mesh networking. Projects like
Guifi or Awmn (see http://guifi.net and http://awmn.gr)
are examples of how this technology integrates with stan-
dard networks and how successful this approach can
be. Future advances will open new possibilities for this
technology [4].
In this paper, we tackle the problem of firewalling in
large mesh networks. In such networks, each mesh node
applies a specific firewall rule-set to the traffic directed to
itself (or to subnets attached to it). The firewall is used to
defend the local network from attacks, to shape the access
to the Internet across a connection, or to forbid the access
to certain logical resources. If all nodes share their rule-
sets and enforce them also on the outgoing traffic, the
traffic is not filtered at the destination but directly at the
source. This reduces the waste of network resources but
forces each node to filter with a global rule-set made of
thousands of rules, which is not practical for most of low-
power Linux-based mesh routers. We propose to split the
global rule-set in pieces and enforce only a portion of it
at every hop with the goal of filtering the packets as close
as possible to their source node in order to save network
resources.
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Figure 1 A commonmesh network structure.
A correctly configured traditional firewall does not
introduce false-positives (packets that should be dropped
but are instead forwarded). Instead, with our approach,
each node singularly introduces some false-positives, but
as a global network function, the firewall will work with
an arbitrary accuracy that can be tuned to the needs.
To stress the difference from a typical firewall we chose
the term waterwall to indicate a distributed and homo-
geneous filtering function spread among all of the nodes
in the network. Note that we use filtering as target appli-
cation for the sake of simple explanation and by way of
example, but the same logic can be applied to other traffic
analysis functions such as intrusion detection.
2 Related works andmotivation
Distributed firewalling has not received much attention
in the literature, but an initial model has been proposed
by Bellovin et al. in [5], where the firewall was moved
from a bastion host to endpoints in a traditional architec-
ture network. Recently, the subject has been investigated
with more attention. Bellovin again, followed by other
authors, proposed a distributed policy enforcement plat-
form [6-10]. These works are not focused on the complex-
ity introduced by large rule-sets. Other works focus on the
application of hash functions to speed up rule matching
[11-13] or on limiting the nodes that enforce the firewall
[14]. None of these works focus on techniques to reduce
the rule-sets on single nodes.
The work whose idea comes closer to the contribution
of this paper is [15], where the most recently matching
rules are stored in a cache that is used to enforce filtering,
thus using only a subset of the entire rule-set. The cache is
split in two halves, with each one regulated with a differ-
ent policy in order to ensure efficiency and fairness. This
approach requires a feedback from the nodes that gener-
ate the rule-sets in order to organize the cache; moreover,
as with every caching strategy, its performance depends
on the characteristics of the underlying traffic.
Our work assumes that the default filtering policy is to
forward a packet. Packets are dropped only when there is
a rule that matches them. This approach is more viable
in a mesh network than a deny-by-default one: for the
last one to be usable, the rule-sets must be perfectly
synchronized and updated; otherwise, there is the risk
of dropping legitimate traffic. In networks where a high
security level is required, also deny-by-default rule-set
can be used as in [16,17], but it does not match our
network scenario.
Additional similarities can be found in the field of intru-
sion detection since filtering with large rule-sets presents
the same difficulties of traffic inspection with a large
database of fingerprints. An approach to distributed intru-
sion detection systems (IDS) like [18] could benefit from
the solution we propose. More affinities can be found in
[19] that, as our work, exploits the distributed nature of an
ad hoc network to spread the IDS function over the entire
network.
2.1 Motivation
Figure 1 shows a widely used configuration for a wireless
mesh network where a set of mesh routers interconnects
separated local area networks (LANs). Each LAN has its
own internet protocol (IP) addressing, and the routing
protocol running on the mesh routers allows the clients of
distinct LANs to communicate. In some cases, nodes may
physically roam from one LAN to another, depending on
the kind of routing protocol they may or may not main-
tain their initial IP addresses to keep their sessions alive.
Finally, some of the LANs have a direct access to the Inter-
net and share it with other users that are not equipped
with it.
In this scenario, the owner of a mesh node is gener-
ally also the manager of the corresponding LAN, and
he is interested in protecting it. We take into considera-
tion three use cases applicable to the simple network in
Figure 1:
1. The manager of network C wants to protect its
network from unwanted traffic coming from the
outside. For instance, he does want to block
connections to remote shell protocols coming from
the mesh network to host A in LAN C.
2. With a finer granularity, he may want to limit access
only to some logical resources; for instance, host A
may have some folders that are shared only on the
LAN while some others are shared with the whole
mesh network. The access to these resources can be
denied or simply limited to a maximum bit rate.
3. The manager of network C wants to forbid some
traffic types that come from the mesh network and
are directed to the Internet using its connection. This
is normally due to the commercial agreements that
Maccari and Lo Cigno EURASIP Journal onWireless Communications and Networking 2013, 2013:225 Page 3 of 12
http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2013/1/225
the manager has with his network service provider.
Again, traffic can be forbidden or it can be limited to
a certain maximum bit rate.
Now imagine that a node in the network labeled E starts
an attack against, let us say, host A. This may be due to a
malicious user or to a virus that took control of a host in
the network and starts a denial of service (DoS) or a brute
force attack. We can add a fourth use case:
4. The manager of network C detects an attack and
reactively enforces network filters to protect its
resources.
The issues described in the use cases can be partially
resolved by configuring a firewall on each mesh node in
order to filter the traffic directed to its LAN. The first
three use cases can be tackled by setting up a mixture of
layer-4 and application layer firewall rules on the mesh
router in C, which will drop or shape some traffic. The
fourth one can be approached with dynamic rules that
are activated when the firewall detects an anomaly in the
usage of the resources, for instance, an abnormal num-
ber of internet control message protocol packets. Modern
Linux-based firewalls support all these features. What
remains unsolved are the consequences for the rest of the
mesh network and for the other LANs. Clearly, the mali-
cious traffic coming from network E will still traverse the
mesh network and subtract useful resources to the other
allowed communications. Considering that in a mesh net-
work the available bandwidth is shared between upload
and download, this can severely impact not only the vic-
tim LAN but also the other networks on the way from
the attacker to the victim. This example shows how the
concept of border firewall does not correctly apply to
the mesh network scenario, where the border itself of the
network is very hard to define.
To solve this problem the mesh routers can share their
rule-sets in order to apply them directly on the other mesh
routers. The rule-set of mesh router C applies only to the
traffic directed to LAN C, to some logical resources it
controls or to the internet traffic flowing across its con-
nection. Each mesh router will publish its rule-set and
collect all the other rule-sets in a global rule-set. Then it
will enforce it directly on the packets that it is forward-
ing so that the traffic is filtered as close as possible to
the source. This approach indeed protects not only the
resources of each LAN but also the shared resources of the
mesh network. It’s not the goal of this paper to investigate
how the rule-sets are securely distributed, in the simplest
case rule-sets can be known in advance and every node
just sponsors the identifier (ID) of one or more predefined
rule-set in routing messages.
Now imagine that this model is applied to a large mesh
network. As an extreme but realistic use case, imagine
that this model is applied to a community wireless mesh
network like the Guifi network. Guifi is made up of thou-
sands of nodesa and used by tens of thousands of users
that daily access the network from various places (see [20]
for a characterization of its topology features). What hap-
pens if even only 10% of themesh routers start distributing
a rule-set made of, let us say, 30 rules each? The result
will be a global rule-set with tens of thousands of rules.
Corporate firewalls can handle large rule-sets up to tens
of thousands of rules, but this is not the case for wire-
less routers that are generally low-cost devices designed
forminimal energy consumption. Themost used products
are commercial devices that embed a low-power proces-
sor (e.g., a 133-MHz Intel or AMD low-end device), one
or more IEEE 802.11b/g/a/n wireless cards, and run a cus-
tomized Linux kernel. The whole hardware is enclosed in
an outdoor shell powered over LAN and costs no more
than 100 e. A 133-MHz processor cannot easily handle
a rule-set made up of thousands of rules organized in a
linear list; it will introduce processing delays and packet
dropping.
To improve filtering performance, rule-sets can be pre-
processed with various approaches, none of which is easy
to port in this context. For instance, once the whole
rule-set has been created, wildcards and numeric ranges
can be used to group rules and reduce their total num-
ber. This involves a complex and costly preprocessing of
the rule-set but speeds up the lookup time during the
routing decision. It is convenient when the rule-set is
mostly static and when the hardware is powerful enough
for the preprocessing. In the case we consider, rules can
be dynamically generated, nodes can be added to or
removed from the network, and links may be temporarily
unavailable. Each of these events will change the rule-sets
or the network topology (and consequently add/remove
rule-sets associated with nodes). Assuming that the
nodes are powerful enough to perform the preprocessing,
they would spend most of their CPU time repeating this
task.
Techniques based on complex data structures, such as
trees or graphs, can be used instead of using a linear list.
The more complex the data structure, the more mem-
ory and preprocessing are needed. The less complex the
data structure, the less the technique will be flexible and
high performing. For instance, rules can be grouped using
their target netmask, but this is meaningless for applica-
tion layer rules, for multicast rules, or when a node that
has a certain resource to be filtered roams to a new net-
work. Moreover, with a mesh network made of thousands
of nodes, there are thousands of netmasks, so filtering
is still cumbersome. This gets even worse with networks
based on IPv6 addresses. Both these approaches are hardly
applicable when the rules do not match IP addresses and
TCP/UDP ports but layer-7 data inside a packet.
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In this work, we take a different direction. We keep the
simplicity of linear lists, but we exploit the cooperative
nature of mesh networks to reduce the overhead for each
single node.
2.2 Firewalls with large rule-sets
Before we detail the proposed approach, we further inves-
tigate the consequences of large rule-sets on the perfor-
mance of the network. Figure 2 reports the increment
in the processing time of a single packet when the rule-
set size grows. The data have been measured using an
embedded system equipped with a 400-MHz processor
and 128Mbytes of RAM over a wired network. Fifty per-
cent of the rules matches the network and transport layer
fields; the rest matches the packet contents at layer 7.
Contrary to the results we obtained in a previous work
[14], where the tests were carried without traffic, the mea-
sures have been taken when the node is under a load
of 1Mbit/s.
With up to 3,000 rules, the delay grows almost lin-
early, meaning that the system is able to handle the load
as expected. After that threshold, the delay grows at a
faster pace and arrives close to 0.5 s with 5,000 rules.
Since this delay is introduced by every node for every hop,
the total round-trip time in a mesh network using large
rule-sets makes the network unusable. Filtering is simply
not a function that can be introduced ‘for free’ when the
rule-sets get large.
3 Filtering based on route length
Consider a network N like the one in Figure 1 where a
proactive routing protocol is running (from now on, we
refer to mesh nodes simply as ‘nodes’). Each node j is con-
nected to a subnet, and for each node j, there exists a
rule-set rj that is used to filter the traffic directed to its
own subnet, to itself, or to the Internet across the connec-
tion attached to its subnet. Node j will sponsor its own
rule-set to the rest of the nodes so that every node is aware
of a global rule-set R = ⋃j rj; ∀j ∈ N . The routing table
of any node i contains the next hop and the distance in
terms of hops to reach j (and all the nodes in the subnet
of j). This is the usual configuration of a mesh network
configured, for instance, with optimized link state routing
(OLSR) protocol [21].
Now consider a packet p coming from the subnet of
node k that is forwarded by node i and is destined to the
subnet of node j. Assume that for this packet, there exists
a rule in R that will drop it when it arrives to j. The aim
of the waterwall is to drop the packet as close as possible
to the source node k. The simplest solution is to enforce
the whole R directly in k. This solution has two drawbacks:
it is impossible if R is made up of thousands of rules for
the considerations introduced in Section 2.2, and it would
be extremely easy to circumvent since, when the packet
leaves its own subnet, it is not filtered anymore. A node k
that behaves in a malicious way can start an attack against
a node j, and all the traffic will arrive at the destinationb.
To tackle the second issue, more nodes on the path from
k to j will have to apply the filter, thus aggravating the
first issue. The strategy we propose is to filter at each hop
with only a subset of the global rule-set that is dynamically
chosen for each packet and for each hop. We aim to use
larger rule-sets for nodes close to the source and smaller

















Figure 2 Delay introduced by a growing rule-set size when the host forwards approximately 1Mbit/s of traffic.
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the strategy behind this intuition, however, requires some
more discussion and formalization. Table 1 contains a set
of definitions that are used (and detailed) in the rest of the
paper.
First of all, how should a node i estimate its distance
from the source node k of a packet p with destination to j?
The simplest way is to look at the time-to-live (TTL) field
in the IP header, but it is also the easiest to circumvent.
The attacker could simply forge packets with a low TTL
and avoid the waterwall to be effective.
Another way is to use the distance from the source node
k to i, but the attacker can set the source IP to the address
of another node w and, contrary to what happens in the
Internet, it would still be able to intercept the replies pro-
vided it is in the shortest path between w and i. Summing
up, node i cannot trust the contents of a packet coming
from a node that is possibly an attacker, so the distance
from the source must be estimated with other means.
What we propose is that each node uses a subset of rules
Ri whose size depends on the ratio between the distance
from the destination and m(i), the average distance of
node i to any node in the network. In practice, node i com-
pares the length of the remaining path to the destination
with the average length of the path of packets generated by
i itself. We define Pf as the probability that node i filters a
packet going from node k to node j:
Pf (k, i, j) 
{
spl(i,j)
m(i) δ if spl(i, j) ≤ m(i)
1 · δ if spl(i, j) > m(i)
(1)
δ is a parameter that can be used to limit the maximum
number of rules enforced in a single node. Node iwill use a
random subsetRi of R of size Pf (k, i, j)×||R||, ensuring that
Pf (k, i, j) is the probability that i filters p. If R is organized
as a linear list, this can be implemented as starting to scan
the list from a random point for a portion of the list of size
Table 1 Definitions and formal notation
Notation Definition
N The set of nodes in the network
sp(i, j) A set of nodes that form the shortest path between node i
and node j
spl(i, j) The length of the shortest path sp(i, j)
δ A parameter that determines the maximum size of a rule-set
enforced on a single node
m(i) The average distance of node i from all the other nodes in N
r The average size of a rule-set used by a node in N
R The global rule-set, i.e., the union of all rule-sets
t(i) The average spl(i, j) computed on node i for every packet
with source k and destination j and for every (k,j) for which
i ∈ sp(k, j) (see Equation 2)
||Ri||. When i is close to j, the fraction spl(i,j)m(i) decreases; in
contrary, when i is close to k, the value of Pf (k, i, j) is close
to 1 · δ. We also define t(i) as the value of spl(i, j) averaged
on all routes passing through i between any couple (k, j).
If we call C(i) the set of all the couples (k, j) for which






To understand how our approach scales with the size
and shape of the network graph, we have to understand
the behavior of t(i). Let us define m and t as the aver-
age m(i) and t(i) computed on every node, respectively;
m is the average number of hops in the network, and t is
the average number of hops remaining after a packet is
forwarded by any node, averaged on all the nodes. Intu-
itively, t must be smaller thanm, but how do t(i) andm(i)
change depending on the position of i in the network? In
the next sections, we will first present the results based on
an example of linear topology, then we will analyze a more
complex two-dimensional (2D) topology.
3.1 1D Linear topology
As a clarifying example, we take a linear topology with
10 nodes and report the average values of t(i), m(i), and
t(i)/m(i) in Figure 3.
It can be noticed that the values of m(i) are influenced
by the position of i in the topology. In particular, nodes
that are close to the periphery will have larger values com-
pared to nodes that are in the center of the topology. This
can be explained noting that when i is in the periphery of
the network, its average distance from the other nodes is
larger than when i is in the center, som(i) is higher on the
periphery. It is also easy to see that in this simple topology,
if we compute t(i) excluding the packets that are gener-
ated by i itself, t(i) is constant. This would make the ratio
t(i)/m(i) decrease for nodes close to the extreme ends of
the network. In the figure, instead, we plot t(i) including
also the packets generated by node i, which increases the
values of t(i) on the periphery. This takes into account that
in our scenario, each node is a gateway for its own subnet,
so the first hop is counted in its own subnet. Even in this
case, t(i)/m(i) is still larger for nodes that are central in
the topology.
We expect the central nodes of the network to be more
congested than the nodes in the borders since the number
of shortest paths that pass across them is higher. Consider-
ing this, the shape of t(i)/m(i) introduces a positive effect:
the more p gets close to the center of the network, the
higher is the chance of being filtered. The practical conse-
quence is that when p is moving from the periphery to the
center of the network, that is more congested, its chances
of being filtered are increased. When p has already passed























Figure 3 Values of t(i), t(m), and their ratio on the sample linear topology with 10 nodes. Each node is identified by an ID corresponding to
its position in the line.
the central region of the network, the chances of being
filtered decrease. If we look it from a different perspec-
tive, we impose a larger filtering effort for packets that
are going towards the most loaded area of the network
because we want to save resources in that area where they
are more precious.When the packets have passed the cen-
tral area, we spend less effort to filter them since they
are directed to the periphery of the network, which is
less congested; in any case, packets will be filtered at the
destination.
We now define the probability that a packet p is filtered
after h hops from the source node k when it is destined to
node j:
P fh (k, h, j) = Pf (k, i, j) where spl(k, i) = h. (3)
P fh ()moves the dependency of Pf () from the node iwhere
the packet is filtered to the position of i in the route from
k to j. P fh () can be averaged for all the couples k, j in order
to keep only the dependency on h. Exploiting P fh (), we can
compute the probability that p arrives at h hops from the




(1 − P fh (i)) (4)
In Figure 4, we report Pa for the same network consid-
ered in Figure 3 when δ = 0.5.
The diameter of the network is equal to nine hops.
When the packet arrives at the destination, it is filtered
with a destination-specific rule-set, so we do not include
the last hop in the curve. We have numbered them from
0 to 8, indicating that the first chance of being filtered is
on node k itself. Figure 4 shows that we obtain indeed the
desired effect: the chances of a packet to be filtered are
higher close to the source and decrease when it gets close
to destination.
3.2 2D Topologies
In the linear topology described so far, the distance
between two nodes is given by the modulus of the differ-
ence between their node IDs, so the results are obtained
by means of simple algebra. When the network topology
is defined on a 2D plane, more complex instruments must
be used. The most suitable instrument to study the behav-
ior of a mesh network with a 2D topology is computer
simulations; nevertheless, we want to test our technique
against networks that may grow up to hundreds of nodes.
Network simulators cannot handle scenarios of such size;
thus, we use Python NetworkX library to evaluate the
characteristics associated with large topologies. For some
applications, approximating a wireless mesh network with
an abstract graph may be a simplification that is too far
from reality. In our case, we rely on the existence of a
proactive routing protocol running in the mesh network.
We are not interested in physical layer and MAC layer
performances (that are more sensitive to the simplifica-
tions introduced by graph analysis); we operate directly
on the graph that the routing protocol generates, assum-
ing that it is able to find neighbor nodes, to identify and
use only symmetric links, and to build the routing table
from any source k to any destination j. This is perfectly
compatible with, for instance, the widely used OLSR pro-
tocol. Note also that we assume the routing protocol uses
a shortest-path metric, and we use NetworkX functions


















Distance from the source
Figure 4 The values of Pa(h) on the linear topology with 10 nodes.
in order to compute the values of spl(i, j) directly on the
graph. It is out of the scope of this paper to show it, but we
believe that the same approach can be applied even when
the routing is not a simple minimum hop. In this case, the
graph will be a weighted one where it is still possible to
compute m(i) and t(i) taking into account the weights of
each graph edge.
To test the performance of the waterwall, we will use
two metrics introduced in previous works [14,22] and
defined as follows:
• M1(k, j). It counts each false-positives on the route
from k to j, that is, it is incremented each time an
unwanted packet is forwarded on the path from the
sender to the destination. It is normalized on the
route length from k to j, so it expresses the fraction of
the path that p is able to reach before being filtered.
• M2(k, j). It counts each false-positives end-to-end,
that is, it is incremented each time an unwanted
packet arrives to j. It is normalized to 1, so it
represents the probability of unwanted traffic to
arrive to destination j.
When averaged on every couple (k, j), M1 gives an
estimation of the impact of false-positives on the whole
network traffic. For instance, when a node that has
been infected by a worm starts a DoS attack against
another host, M1 tells how much the waterwall fails
to mitigate this attack in terms of wasted network
resources.
M2 instead measures the inefficiency in filtering traffic
directed against a specific host. In our scenario, the des-
tination node j applies its own rule-set so that M2 always
goes to zero when p arrives to its destination. But we con-
sider it since it is useful in other scenarios (for instance, for
intrusion detection or when some traffic is forbidden by a
network administrator but not all nodes support filtering).
M2(k, j) = Pa(k, j) as it is the probability of not being
filtered on the whole path from k to j. M1 is defined as





spl(k, i) × M2(k, i) × Pf (k, i, j)




The first term of the equation takes into account pack-
ets that are filtered before they arrive to the destination
(including node k). It is the sum of the path length from
k to i, multiplied by the probability of reaching i and mul-
tiplied again by the probability of being filtered on node
i. The second terms takes into consideration the packets
that arrive to the destination j.
One more evaluation parameter we consider is the aver-
age end-to-end delay for every route in the network.
For a network in which every node j has a rule-set of
size rj = 30, for each route, we compute the average
end-to-end delay introducing at every node a processing
delay d that depends on Pf (k, i, j). The value of d is taken
directly from the data measured on a real platform and





















Figure 5MetricM1 for increasing network size and δ ranging from 0.1 to 0.9.
reported in Figure 2. The delay thus depends on the total
number of nodes and on the value of the δ parameter.
Figures 5, 6, and 7 report the value of the metrics M1,
M2, and delay for a 2D topology with random place-
ment of nodes, increasing the network size and varying
δ. The nodes are placed in an area of growing size with
constant spatial density of nodes, and each node is con-
nected to the neighbors that fall inside a radius of 70 m.
Using NetworkX primitives, we are able to compute the
shortest paths on the considered graphs and compute the
equations we have defined so far.
We can see that, as expected, M1 and M2 decrease
when δ is increased (recall thatM1 andM2 measure false-
positives, so they are measures of badness). This is intu-
itive since a larger δ corresponds to less false-positives.
Less intuitive is the fact that given a certain δ, a larger
network has smaller values of M1 and M2. In the pre-
vious section, we have shown that the values of t(i) are
smaller if i is close to the periphery of the network; this
is true also in 2D topologies. As a consequence, the ratio
t(i)/m(i) is smaller in the periphery of the network as




















Figure 6MetricM2 for increasing network size and δ ranging from 0.1 to 0.9.


































Figure 7 Estimated delay for increasing network size and δ ranging from 0.1 to 0.9.
of the network is represented by nodes that are placed
on the perimeter of the covered area and that have fewer
neighbors compared to the ones that are at the center of
the area. If we keep the density constant and increase the
number of nodes, we increase the covered area and, con-
sequently, its perimeter. But the perimeter of the network
grows more slowly compared to the area, so in larger net-
works the fraction of the nodes on the perimeter becomes
less relevant. As a consequence, a larger network will
have a larger average value of the t/m ratio and will fil-
ter more packets per hop. Figure 7 shows the average
end-to-end delay for the networks under consideration.
A larger δ corresponds to higher processing delays intro-
duced at every hop.
To interpret these results, consider a network with
200 nodes and 30 rules per node, thus ||R|| = 6, 000. With
such a large rule-set, each hop would introduce a delay
larger than 0.45 s, as can be seen in Figure 2. If we con-
sider that m in such a network has an average larger than
8, this would produce an average delay larger than 3.6 s,
which would make the network unusable. Instead, with
the waterwall approach, we can configure the δ parame-
ter in order to find the right equilibrium between latency
and filtering efficiency; for instance, if δ = 0.4 we obtain
an average M1 lower than 50% and keep the delay around
0.15 s. That is, we decrease the filtering efficiency to one
half, but we reduce the delay by a factor of 24.
Still, if a higher performance of the firewall is needed
with a large network size, the delay introduced by the
waterwall must be further reduced. In the next section,
we introduce an optimization that, at the cost of a sim-
ple ordering function applied to the rule-set, can further
reduce the false-positive rate.
3.3 Smart rule-set partition
When node i processes a packet p from k to j, it randomly
chooses a position λ in R and uses a portion Ri of the rule-
set of size Pf (k, i, j)×||R|| starting from position λ. Packet
p is tested against all the rules in Ri. The probability of
evaluating the same rule twice in the path from source to
destination given that each choice of λ is independent at
each hop is high due to the so-called birthday paradox. If
we are able to use minimum overlapping Ri sets, then we
can expect that M1 and M2 decrease faster with the dis-
tance from the source. The results obtained with disjoint
rule-sets are reported in Figures 8 and 9 and represent an
upper bound of the gain reachable with this improvement.
Comparing Figures 5 and 8, we can see that to obtain sim-
ilar results, a lower value of δ is sufficient; for instance, to
haveM1 below 50%, δ = 0.3 is sufficient (even if δ = 0.2 is
below 50% for a network larger than 100 nodes) which cor-
responds in Figure 7 to a tolerable delay even for a network
with 300 nodes.
We can thus try to find a smarter way to choose λ in
order to minimize the intersection between different Ri
along the path. In this paper, we introduce two proposals
to be further evaluated in future works.
The first is to choose λ as a function of specific network
parameters of p and node i:
x = (IPdest ⊕ IPsrc ⊕ (IPchk|IPid) ⊕ ÎPi) (6)
λ = x (mod||R||) (7)
where
• ⊕ is the XOR operator, | is the concatenation
operator, and (mod) is the modulo operation





















Figure 8MetricM1 for increasing network size and δ ranging from 0.1 to 0.9 with ordered rule-set.
• IPdest and IPsrc are the destination and source IP
addresses of p, respectively
• IPchk and IPid are checksum and identification field of
the IP header, respectively. Those fields are
immutable from source to destination, and their
combination is unique for each packet. They are
concatenated since their size is just half of the size of
an IP address.
• ÎPi is the IP address of node i with inverted byte order.
Bytes are swapped since we want the host identifier
of the IP that has a larger variability to be the most
significant byte. Otherwise, the modulo operation
may just return the same value for each host.
The rationale of this choice is to produce a λ that
changes from hop to hop depending on a unique parame-
ter of node i. In this way, we spread the choices of λ with a
deterministic algorithm and try to get a better coverage of
R. Nevertheless, we have to avoid that a node i determin-
istically selects the same λ for all the packets belonging to
the same flow (identified by IPs and ports). If this condi-
tion does not hold and a node always chooses the same
rule-set to filter the packets, then there is a chance that
portions of R are never covered.
If this condition does not hold, then an attacker may try
to precompute the behavior of the nodes in between the




















Figure 9MetricM2 for increasing network size and δ ranging from 0.1 to 0.9 with ordered rule-set.
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highest probability of not being filtered. For this reason,
we introduce in Equation 6 the unique identifier IPid and
the checksum IPchk in order to make λ hard to predict
along the evolution of the traffic flow.
As an alternative approach, we could use spl(i,j)m(i) to deter-
mine not only the size of Ri, but also its position in R. This
way, λ would not depend on some identifier of the node
that is performing the filtering (IPi) but on the estima-
tion of its position in the path from source to destination.
This proposal, as the previous one, is an initial design that
needs further analysis.
For both these approaches to be applicable, every node
must keep the rules in its rule-set in an ordered list. Nev-
ertheless, we do not lose the generality of the approach
since the ordering is independent on the semantics of the
rule, so it can be applied to rules of any kind. For instance,
given the data structure that is used to store the rule in the
operating system, an ordering based on a fingerprint on
this data structure is sufficient.
Note that in all the results we have shown so far,M1 and
M2 hardly reach values lower than 0.1. This is due to the
fact that Pf (k, i, j) in Equation 1may not be equal to 1 even
if δ = 1 at the first hop for the case spl(i, j) > m(i). To
have values of Pf (k, i, j) closer to 1, we can use δ > 1. In
this case, Equation 1 must be modified in order to make
the value of Pf () bounded by 1, as follows:
Pf (k, i, j) 
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
spl(i,j)
m(i) δ if spl(i, j) ≤ m(i) and spl(i,j)m(i) < 1/δ
1 if spl(i, j) ≤ m(i) and spl(i,j)m(i) > 1/δ
1 if spl(i, j) > m(i)
.
(8)
The rest of the equations do not change. In Figure 10,
we reportM1 andM2 when δ is larger than 1; for the sake
of clarity, we report only the smallest scenario (50 nodes).
It can be noticed that the metrics follow the same trend
observed for values lower than 1 and reach values lower
than 0.1.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have introduced a new model to perform
distributed firewalling in mesh networks that take advan-
tage of the multihop nature of those networks to share
the load needed for the filtering function. To stress the
difference with a traditional firewall, we chose the term
waterwall indicating a fluid and distributed network func-
tion, instead of a single filtering host. We have shown that
the waterwall can be used to greatly reduce the unwanted
traffic in amesh network. To quantify the cost of the filter-
ing function, we used the delaymeasured on an embedded
processor by large rule-sets and have shown that our
approach scales well up to mesh networks of hundreds of
nodes. The source code used to realize the test is avail-
able on the website of the main project financing this work
(www.pervacy.eu).
As future work, we intend to implement the filtering
strategy on a network simulator in order to test and
optimize the enhancement described in Section 3.3. After-
wards, we plan to embed this technique in some widely
used routing protocol implementation, such as OLSR, in
order to test on real networks.
Endnotes
a At the time of writing, the Guifi network is made up



















Figure 10MetricM1 andM2 with both filtering strategies when the value of δ is larger than 1.
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nodes per week. The network is divided in zones, each
one can be formed by hundreds of nodes.
b The attacker we take into consideration is able to
mangle the contents of packets, but we imagine that the
routing protocol implements some security measures to
avoid, or at least identify, attacks on network routing.
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